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We study a dynamic pricing problem with nite inventory and parametric uncertainty on the demand
distribution. Products are sold during selling seasons of nite length, and inventory that is unsold at the
end of a selling season perishes. The goal of the seller is to determine a pricing strategy that maximizes the
expected revenue. Inference on the unknown parameters is made by maximum likelihood estimation.
We show that this problem satises an endogenous-learning property, which means that the unknown
parameters are learned on-the-y if the chosen selling prices are suciently close to the optimal ones. We
show that a small modication to the certainty equivalent pricing strategy - which always chooses the optimal
price w.r.t. current parameter estimates - satises Regret(T ) =O(log2(T )), where Regret(T ) measures the
expected cumulative revenue loss w.r.t. a clairvoyant who knows the demand distribution. We complement
this upper bound by showing an instance for which the regret of any pricing policy satises 
(logT ).
Key words : dynamic programming/optimal control: Markov; marketing: estimation/statistical techniques,
pricing;
1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction and Motivation
The emergence of the Internet as a sales channel has made it very easy for companies to experiment
with selling prices. Where in the past costs and eorts were needed to change prices, for example by
issuing a new catalogue or replacing price tags, and consequently prices were xed for longer periods
of time, nowadays a webshop can adapt its prices with a proverbial ick of the switch, without
any additional costs or eorts. This exibility in pricing is one of the main drivers for research on
dynamic pricing : the study of determining optimal selling prices under changing circumstances.
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A much-studied situation is a rm that sells limited amounts of products during nite selling
seasons, after which all unsold products perish. Examples of products with this property are ight
tickets, hotel rooms, car rental reservations, and concert tickets (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004). An
important insight from the literature on dynamic pricing is that the optimal selling price of such
products depends on the remaining inventory and the length of the remaining selling season, see
e.g. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). The optimal decision is thus not to use a single price but a
collection of prices: one for each combination of remaining inventory and length of remaining selling
season. To determine these optimal prices it is essential to know the relation between the demand
and the selling price. In most literature from the nineties on dynamic pricing it is assumed that
this relation is known to the seller, but in practice exact information on consumer behavior is
generally not available. It is therefore not surprising that the review on dynamic pricing by Bitran
and Caldentey (2003) mentions dynamic pricing with demand learning as an important future
research direction. The presence of digital sales data enables a data-driven approach of dynamic
pricing, where the selling rm not only determines optimal prices, but also learns how changing
prices aects the demand. Ideally, this learning will eventually lead to optimal pricing decisions.
In this study we consider a pricing-and-learning problem motivated from the hotel industry
(Talluri and van Ryzin 2004, section 10.2, Weatherford and Kimes 2003). In that context, a \prod-
uct" corresponds to a combination of arrival-date and length-of-stay (possibly augmented by other
features or requirements). These products are perishable (unsold opportunities cannot be held in
stock), are sold during a nite time period, and the available capacity is nite. An important
feature of this context is that a rm typically sells many dierent products with similar demand
characteristics at the same time. This means that learning the demand characteristics of each
product separately may not be very ecient; instead, the rm would want to learn about consumer
behavior from all the sales data corresponding to products with similar demand characteristics.
This motivates the current study of dynamic pricing and learning for perishable products with
nite initial inventory, during multiple nite selling seasons.
1.2. Contributions
We consider a parametric demand model which includes linear, exponential, and logit demand;
these demand functions are frequently encountered in theory and practice (Talluri and van Ryzin
2004). The uncertainty in the demand is modeled by unknown parameters that can be estimated
from historical sales data using maximum likelihood estimation. We propose a pricing strategy
that is structurally very intuitive, and easy to understand by price managers: at each moment
where prices can be changed the price manager calculates a statistical estimate of the unknown
parameter; subsequently she determines the optimal price, assuming that the parameter estimate
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is correct, and she uses this price until the next decision moment. In other words, at each decision
moment the price manager acts as if she is certain about the parameter estimates. Only in the last
period of a selling season for which inventory is still positive, a small deviation on this price may
be prescribed by our pricing strategy.
This type of strategy for sequential decision problems under uncertainty is known under dierent
names in the literature: certainty equivalent control, myopic control, passive learning, and the
principle of estimation and control. There are problems for which certainty equivalent control is
not a good strategy, e.g. the multi-period control problem (Anderson and Taylor 1976, Lai and
Robbins 1982), and dynamic pricing with innite inventory (Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012,
Keskin and Zeevi 2014, den Boer and Zwart 2014b). In these two examples, passive learning is
not sucient to learn the parameters: the decision maker should actively account for the fact that
she is not only optimizing prices, but also tries to \optimize" the learning process. This implies
that sometimes decisions should be taken that seem suboptimal in the short term. In the dynamic
pricing problem with innite inventory, this can be accomplished by the controlled variance policy
of den Boer and Zwart (2014b) or the MLE-cycle policy of Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012).
The innite-inventory setting is also closely related to several problems from the online convex-
optimization, multi-armed bandit and stochastic approximation literature; see den Boer and Zwart
(2014b) for references and a brief discussion on similarities and dierences with dynamic pricing.
In the situation that we study in this article, dynamic pricing with nite inventory and nite
selling seasons, certainty equivalent control does perform well: the parameter estimates converge
with probability one to the correct values, and the prices converge to the optimal prices. The
Regret(T ), which measures the expected amount of revenue loss in the rst T selling seasons due
to not using the optimal prices, is O(log2(T )). This growth rate is considerably smaller than
p
T ,
which is the best achievable growth rate of the regret for the problem with innite inventory (in
dierent settings, this is shown by Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), Besbes and Zeevi (2011), Broder
and Rusmevichientong (2012) and Keskin and Zeevi (2013)), and moreover, this bound can hardly
be improved. We show an instance for which any pricing strategy has Regret(T )K0 log(T ), for
some K0 > 0 independent of T . This means that the upper bound log
2(T ) on the regret is close
to the best achievable growth rate. In Remark 4 we discuss the small gap between the lower and
upper bound.
Thus, the regret, which can be interpreted as the \cost for learning", is structurally dierent in
these two models: in our nite-inventory setting Regret(T ) =O(log2(T )) is attainable, whereas in
the innite-inventory setting Regret(T ) =
(
p
T ) for any policy.
This dierence in qualitative behavior seems to be related to the presence of \uninformative
prices" (Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012) or \indeterminate equilibria" (Harrison et al. 2012):
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there are values of the parameter estimates such that the expected demand observed at the corre-
sponding optimal price (optimal w.r.t. these estimates) is precisely equal to what these parameter
estimates would predict; in other words, at these indeterminate equilibria, the observations seem to
conrm the correctness of the (possibly incorrect) parameter estimates. The impact of indetermi-
nate equilibra on achievable regret rates is, for general control problems, not yet fully understood.
That they play an important ro^le is apparent, for example, from Broder and Rusmevichientong
(2012) who show that in the special case of \well-separable demand functions", which rules out
indeterminate equilibria, the smallest achievable regret growth rate is log(T ) instead of
p
T ; more-
over, this is achieved by a certainty-equivalent control rule, whereas the policies shown to achieve
O(
p
T ) regret in the general case all require active price experimentation to ensure consistency.
In our setting with nite inventories and nite selling seasons, the optimal price - optimal w.r.t.
certain parameter estimates - is not a xed number, but a collection of prices: one price for each pair
of remaining inventory and remaining length of the selling season. Because both these quantities
are constantly changing, a certainty equivalent policy induces dispersion in the selling prices. This
price dispersion causes the parameter estimates to converge to the true value, and as a result, a
(small modication of) certainty equivalent policy works well. The remarks following Theorem 1
further elaborate on the dierence between the nite and innite-inventory setting.
The main conceptual takeaway of our paper is that, in decision problems under uncertainty,
a certainty equivalent strategy works well if it induces sucient dispersion in the controls. We
show this for a specic dynamic-pricing problem, but, as we argue in Section 5.3, the idea is also
applicable in other decision problems.
1.3. Literature
Our work complements two streams of literature on dynamic-pricing-and-learning. First, in the
innite-capacity setting (Kleinberg and Leighton 2003, Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012, Keskin
and Zeevi 2014, den Boer and Zwart 2014b, den Boer 2014) it is known that active price exper-
imentation is necessary to achieve optimal regret; myopic policies have suboptimal performance
(den Boer and Zwart 2014b, Section 3.1). In our nite-capacity setting, changes in the marginal-
value-of-inventory causes endogenous price dispersion, which makes sure that learning the unknown
parameters \takes care of itself", and which leads to a qualitatively much better performance than
what is possible in the innite-capacity setting.
Second, in the nite-capacity setting where demand and inventory level grow to innity (Besbes
and Zeevi 2009, Wang et al. 2014), active price experimentation is a key ingredient in all known
asymptotically optimal policies; the amount of price dispersion induced by a certainty equivalent
policy appears to be insucient to ensure consistency and asymptotic optimailty. This asymptotic
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regime may have practical value if demand, initial inventory, and the length of the selling season
are relatively large. In the application that inspired the current study, pricing in the hotel industry,
this is not the case: the average demand, initial capacity and length of a selling season are typically
quite small, which makes this particular asymptotic regime not a suitable setting to study the
performance of pricing strategies. We therefore consider a dierent asymptotic regime that allows
for small initial inventories and short selling seasons, and we show that in this regime certainty
equivalent control performs well. For a comprehensive overview of the literature on dynamic pricing
and learning, we refer to den Boer (2013b).
From a methodological point of view, our work is related to the literature on adaptive control
in Markov decision problems (Hernandez-Lerma 1989, Kumar 1985, chapter 12 of Kumar and
Varaiya 1986, Hernandez-Lerma and Cavazos-Cadena 1990, Altman and Shwartz 1991, Burnetas
and Katehakis 1997, Gordienko and Minjarez-Sosa 1998, Chang et al. 2005) and to the literature
on partially observable Markov decision problems (Monahan 1982, Lovejoy 1991) that typically
learns unknown parameters in a Bayesian fashion. The topic of combined statistical learning and
optimal control is currently an important topic in operations research, and is studied e.g. in in-
ventory control (Kunnumkal and Topaloglu 2008, Huh and Rusmevichientong 2014), assortment
optimization (Saure and Zeevi 2013), network revenue management (Besbes and Zeevi 2012), and
many more application areas.
1.4. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model primitives and states
convergence rates for the maximum likelihood estimator of . The endogenous-learning property of
the system is described in Section 3.1. Our pricing strategy is introduced in Section 3.2, the upper
bound Regret(T ) = O(log2(T )) is shown in Section 3.3, and the log(T ) lower bound in Section
3.4. Numerical illustrations of the pricing strategy and its performance are provided in Section 4.
To avoid heavy notation, we assume in these sections that dierent selling seasons have the same
initial inventory and duration. Section 5.1 relaxes these assumptions and shows that O(log2(T ))
regret still can be achieved. We also discuss extensions to non-stationary demand (Section 5.2) and
applications of endogenous learning in other decision problems (Section 5.3). The e-companion to
this paper contains the mathematical proofs of the theorems in this paper, as well as a number of
auxiliary lemmas used in the proofs.
Notation If v is a vector then jjvjj denotes the Euclidean norm, and vT the transpose. If A is a
square matrix then min(A) denotes the smallest eigenvalue of A. For x2R, bxc denotes the largest
integer which is smaller than or equal to x. With 1E we denote the indicator of an event E.
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2. Model Primitives
In this section we subsequently introduce the model, describe the characteristics of the demand
distribution, discuss the optimal pricing policy under full information, introduce the regret as
measure of pricing policies, and discuss convergence rates for the maximum likelihood estimator.
2.1. Model Formulation
We consider a monopolist seller of perishable products which are sold during consecutive selling
seasons. Each selling season consists of S 2N discrete time periods: the i-th selling season starts at
time period 1+ (i  1)S, and lasts until period iS, for all i2N. We write SSt = 1+ b(t  1)=Sc to
denote the selling season corresponding to period t, and st = t  (SSt  1)S to denote the relative
time in the selling period. At the start of each selling season the seller has C 2N discrete units of
inventory at his disposal, which can only be sold during that particular selling season. At the end
of a selling season, all unsold inventory perishes.
In each time period t2N the seller has to determine a selling price pt 2 [pl; ph]. Here 0< pl < ph
denote the lowest and highest price admissible to the rm. After setting the price the seller observes
a realization of demand, which takes values in f0;1g, and collects revenue ptdt. We let ct, (t2N),
denote the capacity or inventory level at the beginning of period t2N, and dt the demand in period
t. If ct = 0 then dt = 0: no demand is observed if the rm is out-of-stock. (The selling price pt in
these periods does not aect the revenue, and may be chosen arbitrarily). The distribution of dt
in case ct > 0 is described in Section 2.2. The dynamics of (ct)t2N are given by
ct =C if st = 1,
ct = ct 1  dt 1 if st 6= 1.
Notice that ct can not become smaller than zero, since dt 1 = 0 if ct 1 = 0.
The pricing decisions of the seller are allowed to depend on previous prices and observed demand
realizations, but not on future ones. More precisely, for each t 2N the set of possible histories Ht
as
Ht = f(p1; : : : ; pt; d1; : : : ; dt)2 [pl; ph]tf0;1gtg;
with H0 = f;g. A pricing strategy  = ( t)t2N is a collection of functions  t :Ht 1! [pl; ph], such
that p1 = 1(;), and for each t 2 the seller chooses the price pt = t(p1; : : : ; pt 1; d1; : : : ; dt 1).
The purpose of the seller is to nd a pricing strategy  that maximizes the cumulative expected
revenue earned after T selling seasons,
PTS
i=1E [pidi]. Here we write E to emphasize that this
expectation depends on the pricing strategy  .
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2.2. Demand Distribution
The demand in a single time period with positive inventory, against selling price p, is a realization
of the random variable D(p). We assume that D(p) is Bernoulli distributed with mean E[D(p)] =
h(0 + 1p), for all p 2 [pl; ph], some (0; 1) 2 R2, and some function h. The true value of  is
denoted by (0), and is unknown to the seller. Conditionally on selling prices, the demand in any
two dierent time periods are independent. We assume that (0) lies in the interior of a set B :=
[l;0; u;0] [l;1; u;1]R2, for some known lower and upper bounds l;0, u;0, l;1, u;1 on 0 and
1, respectively, and with u;1 < 0. Furthermore we assume that h(z) is three times continuously
dierentiable in z, log-concave, h(z) 2 (0;1) and _h(z)> 0, for all z 2 f0+ 1p j p2 [pl; ph];  2Bg;
here _h denotes the derivative of h.
Demand functions that t into our framework (with appropriate conditions on B and [pl; ph])
include h(z) = exp(z), h(z) = z, and h(z) = logit(z) = exp(z)=(1+ exp(z)).
2.3. Full-information Optimal Solution
If the value of  is known, the optimal prices can be determined by solving a Markov decision
problem (MDP). Since each selling season corresponds to the same MDP, the optimal pricing
strategy for multiple selling seasons is to repeatedly use the optimal policy for a single selling season.
The state space of this MDP is X = f(c; s) j c= 0; : : : ;C; s= 1; : : : ; Sg, where (c; s) means that there
are c units of remaining inventory at the beginning of the s-th period of the selling season, and the
action space is the interval [pl; ph]. If action p is used in state (c; s), s < S, then with probability
h(0 + 1p) a state transition (c; s)! ((c   1)+; s + 1) occurs and reward ph(0 + 1p)1c>0 is
obtained; with probability 1 h(0+1p) a state transition (c; s)! (c; s+1) occurs and zero reward
is obtained. The states (c;S) are terminal states; the reward using action p equals ph(0+1p)1c>0
with probability h(0+1p), and zero with probability 1 h(0+1p).
A (stationary deterministic) policy  is a matrix ((c; s))0cC;1sS in the policy space  =
[pl; ph]
(C+1)S. Given a policy  2, let V  (c; s) be the expected revenue-to-go function starting
in state (c; s)2X and using the actions of . Then V  (c; s) satises the following recursion:
V  (c; s) = (1 h(0+1(c; s))) V  (c; s+1)
+h(0+1(c; s))  ((c; s)+V  (c  1; s+1)); (1 cC); (1)
V  (0; s) = 0; (2)
for all 1 s S, where we write V  (c;S+1)= 0 for all 0 cC.
By Proposition 4.4.3 of Puterman (1994), for each  2B there is a corresponding optimal policy
 2. This policy can be calculated using backward induction. Write V(c; s) = V

 (c; s) for the
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optimal revenue-to-go function. Then V(c; s) and 

(c; s), for 1  c  C, 1  s  S, satisfy the
following recursion:
V(c; s) = max
p2[pl;ph]

p V(c; s+1)

h(0+1p)+V(c; s+1);
(c; s) = argmaxp2[pl;ph]

p V(c; s+1)

h(0+1p);
(3)
where we dene V(c; s) = V(c; s)  V(c  1; s), and V(0; s) = 0 for all 1 s S. The price
(0; s) can be chosen arbitrarily, since it has no eect on the reward. For c 1, the prices (c; s)
in (3) are uniquely dened; this follows from Lemma EC.1. The optimal reward of the MDP is
equal to V(C;1), and the true optimal reward is equal to V(0)(C;1).
We assume that pl and ph satisfy
pl <

l
(C;S) and u(1;1)< ph; (4)
where we write l = (l;0; l;1) and u = (u;0; u;1). By Lemma 1, this condition ensures that the
optimal price decisions do not depend on the boundary prices pl and ph. Note that equation (4) is
not dicult to check in practice; it only involves solving the MDP for  = l and  = u.
Lemma 1. (c; s)2 (pl; ph), for all  2B, 1 cC, and 1 s S.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let  2 B, 1  c  C, 1  s  S, and let pa; be as in Lemma EC.1. By
application of Lemma EC.2(v), Lemma EC.2(iv), and Lemma EC.1(ii), it follows that
(c; s) (1;1) = pV(1;2); = pV(1;2);  pVu (1;2);u = 

u
(1;1)< ph;
and
(c; s) (C;S) = p0;  p0;l = l(C;S)> pl:

2.4. Regret Measure
The quality of the pricing decisions of the seller are measured by the regret: the expected amount
of money lost due to not using optimal prices. The regret of pricing strategy  after the rst T
selling seasons is dened as
Regret( ;T ) = T V(0)(C;1) 
TSX
i=1
E[pidi]; (5)
where (pi)i2N denote the prices generated by the pricing strategy  .
Maximizing the cumulative expected revenue is equivalent to minimizing the regret, but observe
that the regret cannot directly be used by the seller to nd the optimal strategy, since it depends
on the unknown (0).
den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories
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2.5. Parameter Estimation
We can estimate the unknown parameter (0) with maximum-likelihood estimation. Dene the
log-likelihood function
Lt() =
tX
i=1
log

h(0+1pi)
di(1 h(0+1pi))1 di

1ci>0; (6)
and the score function (the derivative of Lt() with respect to )
lt() =
tX
i=1
_h(0+1pi)
h(0+1pi)(1 h(0+1pi))

1
pi

(di h(0+1pi))1ci>0: (7)
We dene ^t to be a solution  2B of lt() = 0; if multiple solutions exists, we choose the one that
maximizes Lt(). If there is no solution of lt() = 0 in B, we dene ^t as the smallest maximizer
(in the lexicographic ordering) of Lt() on B; in this case ^t necessarily lies on the boundary of
B. Note that ^t only depends on sales data of periods with positive inventory.
Remark 1. Because we allow for a general class of functions h (so-called nonnatural or general
link functions, in the terminology of generalized linear models), the likelihood function Lt() is
not necessarily concave and the solution to lt() = 0 is not necessarily unique; cf. the discussion in
Section 4.1 of Fahrmeir and Kaufmann (1985). However, Proposition 1 in Section 2.6 guarantees
that, for all suciently large t, lt() = 0 has a solution in B, and provides a condition that ensures
convergence to (0). This is the reason that we dene ^t as solution to lt() = 0, instead of directly
as maximizer of the log-likelihood function. If h is the logit function (the so-called canonical link
function in this context), then Lt() is concave and the solution to lt() = 0 is unique.
2.6. Convergence Rates of Parameter Estimates
Understanding the asymptotic behavior of the maximum likelihood estimate, in particular the
speed at which it converges to (0), is important for studying the performance of pricing strategies.
We include a result about these convergence rates based on den Boer and Zwart (2014a); in Section
3.3, this result is used to prove bounds on the regret of a pricing strategy.
The speed at which the estimates converge to (0) turns out to be closely related to a certain
measure of price dispersion: the more price dispersion, the faster the parameters converge. In
particular, if we dene the matrix
Pt =
tX
i=1

1 pi
pi p
2
i

1ci>0; (t2N); (8)
then min(Pt), the smallest eigenvalue of Pt, turns out to be a suitable measure for the amount of
price dispersion in a sample.
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The following proposition shows how min(Pt) inuences the convergence speed of the parameter
estimates. To state the result, we dene for all > 0 the last-time random variable
T = sup

t2N j there is no  2B with  (0)  and lt() = 0	 ; (9)
Proposition 1. Suppose L is a non-random function on N such that min(Pt)L(t)> 0 a.s., for
all t t0 and some non-random t0 2N, and such that inftt0 L(t)t  > 0, for some > 1=2. Then
there exists a 1 > 0 such that for all 0 <   1 we have T <1 a.s., E [T] <1, and for each
t > T there is a ^t 2B with lt(^t) = 0, and
E
h
jj^t (0)jj21t>T
i
=O (log(t)=L(t)) :
By application of Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Remark 2 in den Boer and Zwart (2014a), with
xi = (1; pi)
T1ci>0 for all i2N, the statement follows.
3. Main Result: a Case of Endogenous Learning
The model described in the previous section satises an endogenous-learning property: if the de-
cision maker does not deviate much from the optimal price policy, then the unknown parameters
of the system are learned very fast. This is caused by a natural amount of price dispersion that
appears when the optimal policy is used. This dispersion causes the estimates ^t to converge very
quickly to the unknown parameters (0), and as a result, the decision maker can use a simple
myopic pricing policy to achieve a very good performance. This is the main takeaway of this paper.
The endogenous-learning property is formally stated in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we formu-
late a pricing strategy, which (apart from a small correction) is equal to a myopic strategy. The
endogenous-learning property causes the regret of this pricing strategy to grow as Regret(T ) =
O(log2(T )); this is shown in Section 3.3. Remark 3 proposes an alternative myopic pricing strategy
with estimates based on completed selling seasons, and argues that the same O(log2(T )) regret
bound applies. These upper bounds are complemented by a lower bound in Section 3.4, where we
show an instance for which no pricing strategy can achieve sub-logarithmic regret.
3.1. Endogenous Learning
The main result of this section is that min(Pt) strictly increases if, during a selling season, prices
are used that are close to those prescribed by , for any  2 B. This means that a continuous
use of prices close to 
(0)
leads to a linear growth rate of min(Pt), which by Proposition 1 im-
plies that the parameter estimates converges very fast to the true value, in particular with rate
E
h
jj^t (0)jj21t>T
i
=O (log(t)=t).
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Theorem 1. Let 1<C <S and k 2N. For each  2B there exist an open neighborhood U R2
containing  and a constant v0 > 0 independent of , such that, if
ps+(k 1)S = 

(s)(cs+(k 1)S; s)
for all s= 1; : : : ; S and some sequence (1); : : : ; (S)2 U \B, then there are 1 s; s0  S with
jps+(k 1)S   ps0+(k 1)Sj  v0=2; c(s+(k  1)S)c(s0+(k  1)S)> 0 (10)
and
min(PkS) min(P(k 1)S) 1
8
v20(1+ p
2
h)
 1: (11)
The condition C < S in Theorem 1 is essential. The setting with C  S can be interpreted as
that C   S items cannot be sold at all, and that each of the remaining S items can only be sold
in a single, dedicated time period. Thus, there is no interaction between individual items, and
the pricing problem is equivalent to S repetitions of the pricing problem with C = 1, S = 1, for
which no price dispersion occurs. Phrased dierently: if C  S then the marginal-value-of-inventory
remains constant throughout the selling season, and thus the optimal price is constant as well.
Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012), den Boer and Zwart (2014b) and Keskin and Zeevi (2014)
consider pricing strategies for this case, and show that the lack of endogenous learning means that
active price experimentation is necessary to learn the unknown parameters. Section 4.4 numerically
explores the eect of C and S on the amount of price dispersion.
If C = 1 then the rm may go out-of-stock in the rst period of a selling season, resulting in a
selling season with zero price dispersion. Consequently, it is not possible to nd a strictly positive
lower bound on the price dispersion per season that holds with probability one (but price dispersion
may occur with probability between zero and one). Because our results rely on an a.s. strictly
positive lower bound of the price dispersion, our results do not cover the case C = 1, and dierent
proof techniques are required to analyze this case.
The proof of Theorem 1 is contained in the Appendix, Section EC.1.
3.2. Pricing Strategy
We propose a pricing strategy based on the following principle: in each period, estimate the un-
known parameters, and subsequently use the action from the policy that is optimal with respect
to this estimate.
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Pricing strategy ()
Initialization: Choose 0< < (ph  pl)=4, and initial prices p1, p2 2 [pl; ph], with p1 6= p2.
For all t 2: if ct+1 = 0, set pt+1 2 [pl; ph] arbitrarily. If ct+1 > 0:
Estimation: Determine ^t, and let pceqp = 

^t
(ct+1; st+1).
Pricing:
I) If
(a) jpi  pjj<  for all 1 i; j  t with SSi = SSj = SSt+1, and
(b) jpi  pceqpj<  for all 1 i t with SSi = SSt+1, and
(c) ct+1 = 1 or st+1 = S,
then choose pt+1 2
 fpceqp+2; pceqp  2g\ [pl; ph].
II) Else, set pt+1 = pceqp.
Given a positive inventory level, the pricing strategy () sets the price pt+1 equal to the price
that is optimal according to ^t, except possibly when the state (ct+1; st+1) is in the set f(c; s) j
c= 1 or s= Sg. This set contains all states that, with positive probability, are the last states in
the selling season in which products are sold (either because the selling season almost nishes, or
because the inventory consists of only a single product). In these states, the price pt+1 deviates from
the certainty equivalent price pceqp if otherwise maxfjpi   pjj j SSi = SSt+1g < . This deviation
ensures that also for small t, when ^t may be far away from the true value 
(0), a minimum amount
of price dispersion is guaranteed.
3.3. Upper Bound on the Regret
The endogenous-learning property described in Section 3.1 implies that if ^t is suciently close to
(0) and  is suciently small, then I) in the formulation of () does not occur. As ^t converges
to (0), the pricing strategy () eventually acts as a certainty equivalent pricing strategy. The
pricing decisions in II) are driven by optimizing current season revenue, and do not reckon with
the objective of optimizing the quality of the parameter estimates ^t. The endogenous-learning
property ensures that the unknown parameter values are learned on the y, and that the pricing
decisions converge quickly to the optimal pricing decisions. The following theorem shows that the
regret of the strategy () is O(log2(T )).
Theorem 2. Let 1<C <S, v0 as in Theorem 1, and  < v0=2. Then
Regret((); T ) =O(log2(T )):
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To prove Theorem 2, we construct a Markov decision problem with a state-space that consists
of all sequences of possible demand realizations in a selling season. This ensures that, conditional
on all prices and demand realizations before a selling season, () corresponds to a stationary
deterministic policy, where each state of the state-space is associated with a unique price prescribed
by (). We subsequently prove several sensitivity results that enable us to quantify the eect of
estimation errors jj^t   (0)jj on the regret. Application of the convergence rates in Proposition
1 then imply the O(log2(T )) bound on the regret. The proof of the theorem is contained in the
Appendix, Section EC.1.
An expression for v0 is given in the proof of Theorem 1. This makes it possible to explicitly
determine values of  for which Theorem 2 is valid.
Remark 2. The pricing strategy () would be more elegant if = 0 would be allowed; this would
remove all the special cases in I) of the specication of (), and would result in a \purely" myopic
strategy. Unfortunately, removing the requirement  > 0 creates technical diculties in proving the
upper bound on the regret. Concretely, an essential ingredient of the proof is a deterministic lower
bound on min(Pt); this enables us to apply Proposition 1 which ensures consistency and provides
convergence rates for ^t. Without the requirement  > 0 the existence of such deterministic lower
bound is not ensured, and dierent proof techniques are necessary to prove the regret upper bound.
A possible route could be to try to prove the conjecture limt!1 jj^t  ^t 1jj= 0 a.s., regardless how
prices pt 2 [pl; ph], t 2N, are chosen. If this conjecture is true then, for all suciently large k 2N,
^1+(k 1)S; : : : ; ^kS all lie suciently close to each other to ensure by Theorem 1 that the myopic
prices based on these estimates have a positive amount of price dispersion in selling season k. This
would be a large step towards proving that Theorem 2 also holds for = 0, i.e. for the \purely"
myopic pricing strategy. Proving this conjecture seems far from trivial, however.
Remark 3. An alternative approach to make a \purely" myopic strategy work, i.e. () with
= 0, is the following: instead of updating the estimates ^t each time period, one could estimate
the parameters solely at the beginning of each selling season. Concretely that means that ^t in the
estimation step of () is replaced by ^(SSt 1)S, with ^0 chosen arbitrarily in B. By Theorem 1
the deterministic lower bound min(PkS) (k 1)  18v20(1+p2h) 1 is valid for all k 2N, and it is not
dicult to show along the same lines of Theorem 2 that this policy (0) satises
Regret((0); T ) =O(log2(T )):
The potential downside of using (0) instead of (),  > 0, is that some of the available sales data
is neglected when forming estimates. Neglecting data generally leads to lower revenues (compare,
for example, the numerical performance of the strategies MLE-CYCLE and MLE-CYCLE-S in
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Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012)), although counterexamples to this intuition are also known
(den Boer 2013a). In this paper we do not further elaborate on the drawbacks or benets of using
all available sales data.
3.4. Lower Bound on the Regret
In this section we complement the O(log2(T )) upper bound of Theorem 2 by a lower bound on the
regret. In particular, we show an instance for which any pricing strategy has regret that grows at
least logarithmically in T . This shows that the asymptotic growth rate of regret of () is close to
the best achievable asymptotic growth rate.
Theorem 3. Let 1<C <S, h the identity function, [pl; ph] = [3=10;8=10], and let B = [5=8;6=8]
[ 3=4; 9=16]. There is a constant K0 such that, for all pricing strategies  and all T 2N,
sup
(0)2B
Regret( ;T )K0 log(T ):
The proof of Theorem 3 consists of two main steps. In the rst step we show that the regret in
a single selling season is bounded from below by a term proportional to the expected estimation
error in a single time period. In the second step we further bound this term, using an adaptation
of the van Trees inequality (Gill and Levit 1995) to our setting where  is estimated with a sample
of random size (caused by the 1ci>0 terms in (7)). The proof of Theorem 3 is contained in the
Appendix, Section EC.1.
Remark 4 (Gap Between Lower and Upper Bound on the Regret). Theorem 2 shows
that the regret of our pricing strategy () is O(log2(T )), and Theorem 3 shows that the regret
of any pricing strategy grows at least as log(T ). This \gap" between log2(T ) and log(T ) points
to the question whether Theorem 2 can be strengthened to O(log(T )). This question turns out
to be rather dicult to answer. The \additional" log(T ) term is caused by the log(t) term in the
convergence rates E
h
jj^t (0)jj21t>T
i
=O(log(t)=L(t)) of Proposition 1. This log(t) term can be
traced back to Proposition 2 of den Boer and Zwart (2014a), who extend the a.s. convergence rates
of least-squares linear-regression estimators obtained by Lai and Wei (1982) to convergence rates
in expectation. Nassiri-Toussi and Ren (1994) show that in some cases the log(t) term is really
present in the behavior of least-squares estimates, and thus cannot simply be removed. On the
other hand, if the design is non-random and the disturbance terms are normally distributed, it can
be shown that this log(t)-term in Proposition 2 of den Boer and Zwart (2014a) can be removed. It
is not at all clear how to determine, for a particular adaptive design, whether the log-term plays
a role in the asymptotic behavior of linear regression estimates. Consequently, it is very hard to
determine whether the log-term in Theorem 2 is present in practice, or is merely a result of the
used proof techniques. For practical applications this issue is fortunately not very important, as it
is quite hard to determine from data if a functions grows like log(T ) or like log2(T ).
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4. Numerical Illustrations
To illustrate the analytical results that we have derived, we provide a number of numerical illustra-
tions. We rst oer a simple instance that illustrates strong consistency of the parameter estimates
and convergence of the relative regret to zero. We also briey consider the \gap" between the upper
bound of Theorem 2 and the lower bound of Theorem 3. We subsequently look at an instance
where we vary the level of initial inventory C and the duration of the selling season S, and look at
the eect on the regret. In the last illustration we look at the eect of dierent values of (C;S) on
the amount of price dispersion, and connect this with the asymptotic regime considered in Besbes
and Zeevi (2009) and Wang et al. (2014). To speed up the simulations, parameter estimates were
not updated during selling seasons (cf. Remark 3).
4.1. Basic Example
As a rst example, we consider an instance with C = 10, S = 20, pl = 1, ph = 20, 
(0)
0 = 2, 
(0)
1 =
 0:4, and h(z) = logit(z). The optimal expected revenue per selling season, V(0)(C;1), is equal to
47:8. We consider a time span of 100 selling periods, and run 100 simulations.
Figure 1 shows the simulation average of the regret after each selling season, and of the relative
regret dened by
Relative regret(T ) =
Regret(T )
T V(0)(C;1))
 100%:
To show some light on the growth rate of the regret, we scale in Figure 2 the regret by a log(T )
and a log2(T ) factor. Theorem 2 entails that Regret(T )= log2(T ) is bounded, which accords with the
righthand plot in Figure 2. However, Theorem 3 suggests that the O(log2(T )) bound may be too
conservative, and that in fact the regret may grow logarithmically (cf. the discussion in Remark 4).
The lefthand plot of Figure 2 shows the regret scaled by a log-factor. This picture does not strongly
support the assertion that Regret(T )= log(T ) is bounded, but this may be caused by nite-horizon
eects. Our numerical simulation thus does not give a conclusive answer on the question whether
this \gap" really exists in practice, or merely is a consequence of used proof techniques. Dierent
choices for (0) show a similar picture.
4.2. Dierent Levels of Initial Inventory
In our second numerical example we illustrate the eect of initial inventory on the regret. We
consider the same instance as in the previous example, but take S = 10 and C 2 f1;2;3; : : : ;9g, and
run 100 simulations for each value of C. Table 1 shows for each C the optimal revenue per selling
season, and the simulation average of the regret, the relative regret, and the estimation error at
the end of the time horizon.
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Figure 1 Simulation average of regret and relative regret
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Figure 2 Simulation average of regret, scaled by log(t) and log2(t).
Table 1 Simulation output for various choices of C
C V(0)(C;1) Regret(100) Relative regret(100) jj^1000 (0)jj
1 8.00 37.01 4.63 % 0.517
2 13.79 49.38 3.58 % 0.478
3 18.06 73.59 4.07 % 0.522
4 21.10 109.0 5.16 % 0.566
5 23.10 199.5 8.64 % 0.753
6 24.24 308.7 12.7 % 1.08
7 24.78 352.5 14.2 % 1.20
8 24.96 395.5 15.9 % 1.33
9 25.00 392.2 15.7 % 1.32
The fourth column of Table 1 suggests that the relative regret is not monotone in C, but is
minimal for some C strictly between 1 and S. This can intuitively be explained as follows. For
larger values of C, the fraction of time that the rm is out-of-stock is small; this means that
estimates are based on more data, which generally increases the quality of the parameter estimates.
However, if C gets close to S then the amount of price dispersion induced by the myopic policy
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decreases: for a substantial portion of a selling season there is hardly any variation in the marginal-
value-of-inventory, and as result the optimal price for dierent states (c; s) in the state-space of the
underlying MDP does not vary much. This behavior is reected in the average estimation error at
the end of the time horizon, shown in the fth column of Table 1.
4.3. Dierent Length of Selling Season
In our third numerical illustration we consider the same instance as in the previous two illus-
trations, but x the inventory level at C = 5, and vary the length of the selling season. We let
S 2 f6;7; : : : ;14g, and for each choice of S run 100 simulations. Table 2 shows for each S the op-
timal revenue per selling season, and the simulation average of the regret, the relative regret, and
the estimation error at the end of the time horizon.
Table 2 Simulation output for various choices of S
S V(0)(C;1) Regret(100) Relative regret(100) jj^100S  (0)jj
6 14.94 243.7 16.3 % 1.246
7 17.25 256.8 14.9 % 1.216
8 19.38 247.6 12.8 % 1.091
9 21.33 231.9 10.9 % 0.946
10 23.10 207.5 8.98 % 0.780
11 24.70 156.0 6.31 % 0.635
12 26.17 120.6 4.61 % 0.529
13 27.51 119.0 4.33 % 0.500
14 28.74 106.2 3.70 % 0.442
The results from Table 2 show that the relative regret is decreasing in S. This is not surprising:
larger values of S means that there are not only more opportunities to sell products, but also more
opportunities to learn about customer behavior. This is reected in the fth column of the table,
which shows that the simulation average of the estimation error at the end of the time horizon is
decreasing in S.
4.4. Eect of C and S on Price Dispersion
The results from Section 4.2 indicate that the ratio between C and S inuences the convergence
speed of parameter estimates. Intuitively, the following happens: if C=S is close to zero, then the
seller is relatively often out-of-stock; as a result less historical data is available to form estimates,
which in general leads to larger estimation errors. If C=S is close to (but strictly smaller than) one,
then the myopic policy induces less price dispersion; as long as the state (c; s) of the underlying
MDP has c=(S s) \close to" one (we do not further quantify this statement here), the prices stay
close to the price that is optimal for C = S, and do not generate much price dispersion.
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To gain some insight on the inuence of C and S on the growth rate of min(Pt), we provide two
numerical illustrations.
In the rst, we take pl = 1, ph = 100, 
(0)
0 = 2, 
(0)
1 =  0:4, h(z) = logit(z). We x C = 10 and
choose S 2 f10;20;50;100;200;500g. For a fair comparison, we let the number of selling seasons T
be equal to 1000=S; the total time horizon then consists of 1000 time periods, for each experiment.
For each choice of S, we perform 100 simulations and record the price dispersion measured by
min(Pt), for t= 1; : : : ;1000.
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Figure 3 Price dispersion, for dierent values of S and T
Figure 3 shows the simulation average of min(Pt) for t= 1; : : : ;1000, for the dierent values of
(S;T ). For all experiments, min(Pt) grows linearly in t. The magnitude of the growth rate (i.e. the
slope of each graph in the gure) depends on the particular choice of S and T .
This magnitude aects the speed at which parameter estimates converge to the true value. Figure
4 shows for S 2 f10;20;50;1000g the simulation average of the estimation error jj^t (0)jj, where
^t is based on the available prices and demand realizations induced by the optimal policy. The
gure shows that the estimation error jj^t (0)jj converges quicker to zero if the price dispersion
min(Pt) grows at a faster rate. For the case S = 10 the parameter estimates do not converge to
the true value, and min(Pt) does not grow to innity. This is the case with C = S, where active
price experimentation is necessary to ensure consistency (see our comments following Theorem 1).
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Figure 4 Estimation error jj^t (0)jj, for dierent values of S and T
Figure 3 shows that the amount of price dispersion at the end of the time horizon, min(Pt) at
t= 1000, is not monotone in S: the largest growth rate is achieved at the experiment with S = 50,
T = 20; for S larger than 50 it is decreasing in S, and for S smaller than 50 it is increasing in S.
This is in accordance with the intuition outlined above, which says that the price dispersion grows
slowly if C=S is close to zero or close to one.
In our second numerical illustration, we look at a scaling of C and S. We take the same instance
as above (i.e. pl = 1, ph = 100, 
(0)
0 = 2, 
(0)
1 = 0:4, h(z) = logit(z)), and consider 100 experiments:
the n-th experiment has S = 10n and C = 3n, for n= 1;2; : : : ;100. For n!1, this is the asymptotic
regime considered in Besbes and Zeevi (2009) and Wang et al. (2014). Note that C=S = 0:3 for
all n; we thus exclude the case where C=S gets close to zero or to one. For each experiment we
run 1000 simulations, and record the price dispersion induced by the optimal policy after a single
selling season, i.e. min(PS), when the prices of the optimal policy are used.
Figure 5 shows the simulation average of min(PS) as function of n (on the left), and as function
of log(n) (on the right). It suggests that the amount of price dispersion, induced by the optimal
pricing policy in a single selling season, grows as log(n). This slow growth rate explains why, in
the asymptotic regime considered by Besbes and Zeevi (2009) and Wang et al. (2014), active price
experimentation is necessary, whereas in our setting a myopic policy works well.
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Figure 5 min(PS), for S = 10n, C = 3n
5. Extensions
5.1. Overlapping Selling Seasons with Varying C and S
To avoid heavy notation that obscures the message of this paper, we assume in the preceding
sections that selling seasons are non-overlapping and have the same initial inventory and duration.
In the application that motivates our study, dynamic pricing in the hotel industry, this might be
too restrictive. In this section we consider the situation where dierent selling seasons may overlap,
and may have dierent initial inventory and duration. We show that an adaptation of (), the
pricing strategy dened in Section 3.2, has Regret(T ) =O(log2(T )).
5.1.1. Setting. Let Cj 2 N denote the initial inventory, Sj 2 N the duration, and tj 2 N the
rst time period of the j-th selling season, for j 2N. W.l.o.g. we assume that t1 = 1 and tj  tj+1
for all j 2 N. Each selling season j corresponds to a product j that is sold, with corresponding
prices and demand realizations. Let cj;s denote the inventory level, pj;s the selling price, and dj;s the
demand of product j in stage s of its selling season, for j 2N and s2 f1; : : : ; Sjg. The dynamics of
cj;s and dj;s are similar as in the \base case" discussed in Section 2: dj;s is Bernoulli distributed with
mean h(0+1pj;s) if cj;s > 0, and dj;s = 0 if cj;s = 0. In addition, cj;1 =Cj and cj;s+1 = cj;s dj;s, for
all j 2N and s= 1; : : : ; Sj. Prices pj;s lie in [pl; ph] and are non-anticipating, i.e. they may depend on
the history of prices and demand realizations Hj;s = f(dj0;s0 ; pj0;s0) j j0 2N;1 s0  Sj0 ; tj0   1+ s0 <
tj 1+sg, but not on future ones. A pricing strategy is a collection of functions  = ( j;s)j2N;1sSj ,
such that each  j;s generates for each possible history Hj;s a price pj;s 2 [pl; ph].
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Figure 6 Fixed or varying initial capacity and duration
Let V(0);Sj (Cj;1) be the optimal reward in a selling season and let 

(0);Cj ;Sj
be the optimal
policy with C = Cj and S = Sj, as dened in Section 2.3. Let pj;s be prices generated by pricing
strategy  . The regret of  after T time periods is dened as
Regret( ;T ) =
X
j:tj 1+Sj<T
n
V(0);Sj (Cj;1) 
SjX
s=1
E[pj;sdj;s]
o
;
i.e. as the cumulative regret over all selling seasons completed before period T .
5.1.2. Pricing strategy and regret bound. Theorem 2 shows in the case of non-overlapping
selling seasons with Cj = C, Sj = S, and tj = 1 + (j   1)S, for all j, that Regret((); T ) =
O(log2(T )). We now show that a modication 0() of this strategy has Regret(T ) =O(log2(T )) in
the more general setting described above.
Similarly as in the setting considered in Theorem 2, estimation of (0) for selling season j is
based on all sales data preceding tj, and of all sales data generated by the product corresponding to
selling season j. (Thus, for estimation we neglect sales data generated in selling seasons overlapping
with season j; this is for technical reasons, and enables us to derive Theorem 4 analogously to the
proof of Theorem 2). In particular, we dene the set
Jj;s = f(j0; s0)2N2 j 1 s0  Sj; tj0   1+ s0  tj   1g[ f(j; s0)2N2 j 1 s0 < sg;
the likelihood function
Lj;s() =
X
(j0;s0)2Jj;s
log
h
h(0+1pj0;s0)
dj0;s0 (1 h(0+1pj0;s0))1 dj0;s0
i
1cj0;s0>0;
and the score function
lj;s() =
X
(j0;s0)2Jj;s
_h(0+1pj0;s0)
h(0+1pj0;s0)(1 h(0+1pj0;s0))

1
pj0;s0

(dj0;s0  h(0+1pj0;s0))1cj0;s0>0;
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and dene ^j;s as in Section 2.5.
We now formally dene the pricing strategy 0(). For notational convenience, write I(t) =
f(j; s)2N2 j 1 s Sj; tj   1+ s= tg for t2N.
Pricing strategy 0()
Initialization: Choose 0< < (ph  pl)=4, and initial prices p1, p2 2 [pl; ph], with p1 6= p2.
Set pj;s = p1 for all (j; s)2 I(1), and pj;s = p2 for all (j; s)2 I2.
For all t 2, and for all (j; s)2 I(t+1):
Estimation: Determine ^j;s.
Pricing:
If cj;s = 0, set pj;s 2 [pl; ph] arbitrarily.
If cj;s > 0, let pceqp = 

^j;s;Cj ;Sj
(cj;s; s), and consider the following two cases:
I) If
(a) jpj;s1   pj;s2 j<  for all 1 s1; s2 < s, and
(b) jpj;s1   pceqpj<  for all 1 s1 < s, and
(c) cj;s = 1 or s= Sj,
then choose pj;s 2
 fpceqp+2; pceqp  2g\ [pl; ph].
II) Else, set pj;s = pceqp.
The following theorem shows, under some conditions on tj, Cj and Sj, that 
0() has the same
O(log2(T )) bound on the regret as ().
Theorem 4. Suppose supj2NCj <1, supj2NSj <1, and 1<Cj < Sj for all j 2 N. In addition,
suppose supt2N jfj 2N : tj = tgj<1. Let v0 as in Theorem 1, and 0< < v0=2. Then
Regret(0(); T ) =O(log2(T )):
The proof is sketched in the Appendix, Section EC.1. The conditions on Cj, Sj and tj ensure
that the initial inventories, the durations of the selling seasons, and the number of selling seasons
starting in any time period, are all bounded.
5.2. Non-stationary Demand
Throughout the paper we assume that the market is stationary: the parameters (0) do not change
over time. In this section we explore what happens if this assumption is violated. We distinguish
between two types of non-stationarity: (i) a \booking curve", meaning that demand depends on
the stage s in the selling season, and (ii) a more general setting where (0) = ((0)(t))t2N is varying
over time.
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5.2.1. Booking curve. A booking curve can be handled by explicitly modeling the depen-
dence of demand on the stage s. For example, one could assume that the demand in a period with
positive inventory is Bernoulli distributed with mean h(
(0)
0 + 
(0)
1 p+ 
(0)
2 s), where p denotes the
price, s the stage in the selling season, and (
(0)
0 ; 
(0)
1 ; 
(0)
2 ) are unknown parameters. Similarly as
in Section 2.3 one can then dene the optimal full-information solution (c; s), with h(0+ 1p)
in all relevant equations replaced by h(0+1p+2s). The design matrix (8) is then equal to
Pt =
tX
i=1
0@ 1pi
si
1A (1; pi; si)1ci>0:
To prove an endogenous-learning property similar to Theorem 1, one should show that for all 
close to (0), using the policy  in selling season k implies min(PkS)  min(P(k 1)S)> , for all
k 2 N and some  > 0 independent of k and . This means that the amount of price dispersion,
measured by the smallest eigenvalue of the design matrix, strictly increases in each selling season,
and that the maximum likelihood estimate of  converges a.s. to the true value. This guarantees
that the prices generated by a (near-)myopic pricing strategy similar to () converge to the true
optimal prices.
In this particular model, with mean demand equal to h(
(0)
0 +
(0)
1 p+
(0)
2 s), a sucient condition
for the endogenous-learning property to hold is that there are prices p1, p2, p3 used in stage s1, s2,
s3, respectively, such that the vectors f(1; pi; si)T j i = 1;2;3g are linearly independent, and such
that cs1cs2cs3 > 0. This implies
min(PSk) min(PS(k 1)) min
 3X
i=1
(1; pi; si)
T (1; pi; si)1ci>0

det
 P3
i=1(1; pi; si)
T (1; pi; si)1ci>0

tr
 P3
i=1(1; pi; si)
T (1; pi; si)1ci>0
2  (p3(s2  s1)+ p2(s3  s1)+ p1(s3  s2))2(3+3S2+3supp2[pl;ph] p2)2 > 0;
which implies the endogenous-learning property. In a similar way as Theorem 2 an upper bound
on the regret of a (near-)myopic policy can then be obtained.
5.2.2. Time-varying parameters. A natural approach to estimate (0)(t), for a particular
t 2 N, is to use maximum-likelihood estimation based on sales data from the time periods ft 
N; : : : ; tg, for some N 2N. This approach is taken in a recent paper by Keskin and Zeevi (2013) in
a dynamic pricing problem, and by Besbes et al. (2014) in a more general stochastic optimization
setting. Both these papers show that the growth rate of the regret of pricing policies and the
\optimal" choice of N depend on some measure of the volatility of the process ((0)(t))t2N.
This approach can in principle also be taken in our setting of dynamic pricing with nite inven-
tories, but there are several technical diculties to overcome. For example, if estimation is based
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on a sample of size N , the niteness of T in Proposition 1 is not guaranteed, and it is not clear
how one could obtain bounds on the mean square estimation error (obtaining such bounds are
necessary to analyze the performance of pricing strategies). Overcoming these technical diculties
is an important and technically challenging direction for future research.
5.3. Endogenous Learning in other Decision Problems
The endogenous-learning property shown in Theorem 1 is the key result that leads to consistency
of the myopic policy and to a regret that grows only O(log2(T )). This property seems not unique
for the pricing problem under consideration, but may be satised by many other decision problems
as well. We here briey outline some types of problems for which this may be the case.
Consider a collection of discrete-time Markov decision problems (MDPs)
f(X;A; p(; ; ; ); r(; ; )) j  2g;
parameterized by a nite-dimensional parameter  contained in some set Rd. For each  2,
(X ;A; p(; ; ; ); r(; ; )) corresponds to an MDP with statespace X , action space A, transition
probabilities of going from state x to x0 when action a is used denoted by p(x;x0; a; ), and the
expected reward of using action a in state x denoted by r(x;a; ), for x;x0 2 X and a 2 A. (see
Puterman (1994) for an introduction to MDPs). The goal of the decision maker may be to optimize
the average reward or discounted reward, over a nite or innite time horizon, without knowing
the value of .
Suppose that each time that an action a is selected in state x, a realization yi of a random
variable Y is observed, the distribution of which depends on x, a, and . With an appropriate
statistical model of Y , the value of the unknown  may at each decision moment be inferred
from the previously observed realizations, chosen actions, and visited stated, using an appropriate
statistical technique (maximum likelihood estimation, (non)-linear regression, Bayesian methods).
If ^ denotes the estimated value of , then a myopic policy is to always select the action that is
optimal if ^ equals the true but unknown .
Strong consistency of an estimator (a.s. convergence of ^ to  as the number of observations
increases) typically presumes a minimum amount of variation/dispersion in the controls; see e.g. Sk-
ouras (2000) and Pronzato (2009) for nonlinear regression models, Chen et al. (1999) for generalized
linear models, the classic Lai and Wei (1982) for linear regression models, and Hu (1996, 1998) for
Bayesian regression models. The decision problems described above satisfy an endogenous-learning
property if the myopic policy induces an amount of dispersion in the controls that guarantees
strong consistency of the estimator. As a result, no active experimentation is then necessary to
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eventually learn the unknown ; learning \takes care of itself" by just simply using myopic ac-
tions. This contrasts with many other decision problems under uncertainty where deviating from
the myopic policy is necessary to eventually learn the unknown parameters of the system (e.g. in
various multi-armed bandit problems).
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e-companion to den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories ec1
Proofs
This e-companion contains the mathematical proofs of the results in the paper. Section EC.1
contains the proof of Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4. The proofs frequently refer to a number of auxiliary
lemmas, which are formulated and proven in Section EC.2.
EC.1. Proofs of Main Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
Let  2B. Consider the k-th selling season, and write c(1) = c1+(k 1)S, c(2) = c2+(k 1)S, : : :, c(S) =
ckS. The proof consists of two steps. In Step 1, we show that there is a v1() > 0 such that if
prices 
(0)
(c(s); s) are used in state (c(s); s), for all s= 1; : : : ; S, then there are 1 s; s0  S with
j(c(s); s) (c(s0); s0)j> v1() and c(s)c(s0)> 0. Since  is continuous in  (Lemma EC.2(vi)),
there is an open neighborhood U  B around  such that, if price (s)(c(s); s) is used in state
(c(s); s), for all s= 1; : : : ; S and some sequence ((1); : : : ; (S))2 U\B, then there are 1 s; s0  S
such that j(s)(c(s); s)  (s0)(c(s0); s0)j> v1()=2, c(s)> 0 and c(s0)> 0. In Step 2 we show that
v1() can be bounded from below by a constant v0 > 0 independent of . This proves (10). Equation
(11) follows by application of Lemma EC.3.
Step 1: Occurence of price change. Dene
/= f(c; s) j S+1 C  s S;S+1  s cCg: (EC.1)
See Figure EC.1 for an illustration of / in the state space X . Notice that since (C;1) =2 / (by the
assumption C <S), the path (c(s); s)1sS may or may not hit /. We show that, in both cases, at
least two dierent selling prices occur on the path (c(s); s)1sS. Let pa; be as in Lemma EC.1
and shorthand write fa; = fa;(p

a;).
Case 1. The path (c(s); s)1sS hits /. Then there is an s such that (c(s); s)2 / and (c(s); s 1)2
(L/), where we dene
(L/) = f(1; S  1); (2; S  2); : : : ; (C   1; S C +1); (C;S C)g
as the set of points immediately left to / in Figure EC.1. The following two properties imply that
a price change occurs when the path (c(s); s)1sS hits /.
(P.1) If (c; s)2 / then (c; s) = p0;, V(c; s+1) = 0, and V(c; s) = (S  s+1)  f0;.
(P.2) If (c; s)2 (L/), then V(c; s+1) h(0+1ph)c 1f0; and
(c; s) ph(0+1ph)c 1f0; ; > p

0;.
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Figure EC.1 Schematic picture of /
Proof of (P.1): Backward induction on s. If s = S and (c; s) 2 /, then the assertions follow
immediately. Let s < S. Then V(c; s+1) = V(c; s+1)  V(c  1; s+1) = 0, (c; s) = p0; and
V(c; s) = maxp2[pl;ph] ph(0 + 1p) + V(c; s+ 1) = (S   s+ 1)  V(1; S), by (3) and the induction
hypothesis. This proves (P.1).
Proof of (P.2). Induction on c. If c= 1 and (c; s)2 (L/), then (c; s) = (1; S  1), V(1; S) = f0;
and (1; S   1) = pV(1;S) = pf0; > p

0;, since by Lemma EC.1(ii) p

a; is strictly increasing in a.
If c > 1 and (c; s) 2 (L/) then (c; s) = (c;S   c), and the induction hypothesis, together with the
optimality of (c;S  c+1), implies
V(c;S  c+1)= V(c;S  c+1) V(c  1; S  c+1)
=((c;S  c+1) V(c;S  c+2))h(0+1(c;S  c+1))+V(c;S  c+2)
 ((c  1; S  c+1) V(c  1; S  c+2))h(0+1(c  1; S  c+1))
 V(c  1; S  c+2)
V(c  1; S  c+2)h(0+1(c  1; S  c+1))
h(0+1ph)c 1f0;;
and (c;S  c) = pV(c;S c+1);  pV(c;S c+1); > p0;, using again Lemma EC.1(ii). This proves
(P.2), and concludes Case 1.
Case 2. The path (c(s); s)1sS does not hit /. Then there is an 1 s S  2 such that c(s) = 2
and c(s+1) = 1. We show by backward induction that
V(2; s) V(1; s+1) (V(1;1)  ph) h(0+1ph); (EC.2)
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for all 2 s S  1, and that V(1;1)< ph. This implies V(2; s+1)<V(1; s+2). By Lemma
EC.1(ii) this implies
(2; s) = p

V(2;s+1);
< pV(1;s+2); = 

(1; s+1); (EC.3)
and thus a price change occurs.
Let 2 s S  1. The optimality of (1; s) and (1; s+1) implies
V(2; s) V(1; s+1)
((2; s) V(2; s+1))h(0+1(2; s))+V(2; s+1)
 ((1; s) V(1; s+1))h(0+1(1; s)) V(1; s+1)
 ((2; s) V(1; s+2))h(0+1(2; s)) V(1; s+2)
=
h
V(2; s+1) V(1; s+2)
ih
1 h(0+1((2; s))
i
 ((1; s) V(1; s+1))h(0+1(1; s))
  (ph V(1; s+1))h(0+1ph)
  (ph V(1;1))h(0+1ph):
Here
h
V(2; s+ 1) V(1; s+ 2)
i
 0 follows from the induction hypothesis if s < S   1, and
follows from V(2; S) V(1; S) = 0 if s= S  1. The last inequality follows from Lemma EC.1(ii).
This proves (EC.2), and concludes Case 2.
We have shown that, on any path (c(s); s)1sS in X starting at (C;1), the policy  induces a
price-change. It follows that there exists a v1()> 0 such that for all paths (c(s); s)1sS,
j(c(s); s) (c(s0); s0)j  v1():
Step 2: Lower bound on magnitude of price change. Property (P.2) in the proof of
Theorem 1 shows that a price change of magnitude
j(c(s); s) (c(s+1); s+1)j  jph(0+1ph)C 1f0; ;   p

0;j
occurs in Case 1, and equation (EC.2) shows that a price change of magnitude
j(c(s); s) (c(s+1); s+1)j  jpV(2;s+1);   pV(1;s+2);j
occurs, with jV(2; s+1) V(1; s+2)j< (V(1;1)  ph)h( + 1ph)< 0 (since V(1;1)  ph =
maxp2[pl;ph] ph(0+1p) ph <maxp2[pl;ph](p ph) = 0). The proof of Lemma EC.1(ii) implies that,
for all 0 a0; a1 < ph and all  2B,
jpa0;   pa1;j  ja0  a1j  inf0aph
 1 _h(0+1pa;)
j fa;(pa;)j
> 0;
ec4 e-companion to den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories
by application of the Mean Value Theorem. If we dene
C = inf
2B
inf
0aph
 1 _h(0+1pa;)
j fa;(pa;)j
> 0
then the magnitude of the price change v1() on the path (c(s); s)1sS, is bounded from below by
v1() v0 := C min

inf
2B
h(0+1ph)
C 1f0;; inf
2B
j(V(1;1)  ph)h(+1ph)j
	
:
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the k-th selling season, for some arbitrary xed integer k  2. The prices generated by
() are based on the estimates ^t, which are determined by the historical prices and demand
realizations. Now, dierent demand realizations can lead to the same state (c; s) of the MDP. For
example, a sale in the rst period of a selling season and no sale in the second period leads to
state (C 2;3), but this state is also reached if there is no sale in the rst period and a sale in the
second period of the selling season. These two \routes" may lead to dierent estimates ^t, and to
dierent pricing decisions in state (C  2;3). Thus, with (), the prices in the k-th selling season
are not determined by a stationary policy for the Markov decision problem described in Section
2.3.
To be able to compare the optimal revenue in a selling season with that obtained by (), we
dene a new Markov decision problem, in which the states are sequences of demand realizations
in the selling season. Conditionally on all prices and demand realizations from before the start
of the selling season, () is then a stationary deterministic policy for this new MDP: each state
is associated with a unique price prescribed by (). This enables us to calculate bounds on the
regret obtained in a single selling season.
We dene this new MDP for any  2B. The state space ~X consists of all sequences of possible
demand realizations in the selling season:
~X = f(x1; : : : ; xs)2 f0;1gs j 0 s S;
sX
i=1
xi Cg;
where we denote the empty sequence by (;). The action space is [pl; ph]. Using action p in state
(x1; : : : ; xs), with 0 s < S induces a state transition from (x1; : : : xs) to (x1; : : : ; xs;1) with proba-
bility h(0+1p)1Psi=1 xi<C (corresponding to a sale, and inducing immediate reward p), and from
(x1; : : : xs) to (x1; : : : ; xs;0) with probability 1  h(0 + 1p)1Psi=1 xi<C (corresponding to no sale,
and inducing zero reward). In the terminal state (x1; : : : ; xS), no transitions occur, no reward is
received, and no actions are taken. Note that the actions in states with zero inventory do not
impact the reward or transitions.
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It is easily seen that the MDP described in Section 2.3 corresponds to the one described here,
except that there states are aggregated: all states (x1; : : : ; xs) and (x
0
1; : : : ; x
0
s0) with s = s
0 andPs
i=1 xi =
Ps0
i=1 x
0
i are there taken together in the state (C  
Ps
i=1 xi; s+1).
Let ~= f~(x) j x= (x1; : : : ; xs)2 ~X ;0 s < Sg be a stationary deterministic policy for this MDP
with augmented state space (dening an action for all except the terminal states (x1; : : : ; xS)), and
let ~V ~ (x) be the corresponding value function, for  2B. For non-terminal states x= (x1; : : : ; xs)2
~X we write (x; 1) = (x1; : : : ; xs;1) and (x; 0) = (x1; : : : ; xs;0). Then, for all non-terminal states
x= (x1; : : : ; xs)2 ~X , s < S, and all  2B, ~V ~ (x) satises the backward recursion
~V ~ (x) = (~(x)1
Ps
i=1 xi<C
+ ~V ~ (x; 1))h(0+1~(x))1
Ps
i=1 xi<C
+ ~V ~ (x; 0)(1 h(0+1~(x))1Psi=1 xi<C);
and ~V ~ (x) = 0 for all terminal states x.
Let ~ be the optimal policy corresponding to  2B, and write ~V(x) = ~V
~
 (x). Then
~V(x) = max
p2[pl;ph]
h
p    ~V(x; 0)  ~V(x; 1)ih(0+1p)+ ~V(x; 0); (EC.4)
~(x) = argmax
p2[pl;ph]
h
p    ~V(x; 0)  ~V(x; 1)ih(0+1p); (EC.5)
for all states (x1; : : : ; xs) with
Ps
i=1 xi <C and s < S, and
~V(x) = 0 for all states (x1; : : : ; xs) withPs
i=1 xi =C or s= S. Analogous to Lemma EC.2, it is not dicult to show that ~

(x) is uniquely
dened and lies in (pl; ph), for all  2B and all states (x1; : : : ; xs) with
Ps
i=1 xi <C and s < S. In
the notation of Lemma EC.1, this implies ( ~V(x; 0)  ~V(x; 1); )2 UAB..
Let U and v0 be as in Theorem 1, 1 as in Proposition 1, and choose 2 (0; 1) such that  2 U
whenever jj (0)jj  . For all l 2N, if (l  1)S > T then ^t 2 U for all t= 1+(l  1)S; : : : ; S(l 
1)S, and Theorem 1 implies min(PlS) min(P(l 1)S) 18v20(1+p2h) 1  122(1+p2h) 1, using v0=2
. If (l   1)S  T, then I) of the pricing strategy () guarantees that there are 1  s; s0  S
such that jps+(l 1)S   ps0+(l 1)Sj  , and Lemma EC.3 then implies min(PlS)   min(P(l 1)S) 
1
2
2(1+ p2h)
 1. It follows that min(PlS) l  122(1+ p2h) 1 for all l 2N, and thus for all t > S,
min(Pt) min(P(SSt 1)S) (SSt  1) 
1
2
2(1+ p2h)
 1  t  1
4S
2(1+ p2h)
 1;
using SSt   1  t (SSt 1)SSSt  t2S . (Recall the denition SSt = 1 + b(t   1)=Sc). By application of
Proposition 1 with t0 = S and L(t) = t  14S 2(1+ p2h) 1, we have
T <1 a.s., E[T]<1, and E[jj^t (0)jj21t>T ] =O (log(t)=t). (EC.6)
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In addition, v0=2 >  implies that I) of the pricing strategy () does not occur for all t with
(SSt  1)S > T. In particular, if (k  1)S > T, then
p1+s+(k 1)S = ~

^s+(k 1)S
(d1+(k 1)S; d2+(k 1)S; : : : ; ds+(k 1)S); (EC.7)
for all 1 s S  1, and
p1+(k 1)S = ~

^(k 1)S
(;): (EC.8)
Let H = (p1; : : : ; p(k 1)S; d1; : : : ; d(k 1)S) denote the history of prices and demand up to and in-
cluding time period (k   1)S. Conditionally on H, and given that (k   1)S > T, the parameter
estimates ^s+(k 1)S in (EC.7) and (EC.8) are completely determined by the state
(d1+(k 1)S; d2+(k 1)S; : : : ; ds+(k 1)S). Thus, for each state (x1; : : : ; xs) with
Ps
i=1 xi < C and s < S,
there is a uniquely associated price prescribed by (). Consequently, there is a stationary deter-
ministic policy, denoted by ~H , such that p1+(k 1)S = ~H(;) and
p1+s+(k 1)S = ~
H(x)
when x= (d1+(k 1)S; d2+(k 1)S; : : : ; ds+(k 1)S), 1 s < S, and
Ps
i=1 di+(k 1)S <C.
This enables us to bound the regret in the k-th selling season:
V(0)(C;1) 
kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
E[pidi]
=E
240@ ~V(0)(;)  kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
pidi
1A1(k 1)ST
35
+E
240@ ~V(0)(;)  kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
pidi
1A1(k 1)S>T
35
 ~V(0)(;)P ((k  1)S  T)
+E
24E
240@ ~V(0)(;)  kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
pidi
1A1(k 1)S>T jH
3535
 ~V(0)(;)
E[T]
(k  1)S (EC.9)
+E
h
E
h
~V(0)(;)  ~V ~
H
(0)
(;)

1(k 1)S>T jH
ii
: (EC.10)
The term (EC.9) is nite because E[T]<1. To obtain an upper bound on the term (EC.10),
we need two sensitivity results:
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(S.1) Write ~ds = (d1+(k 1)S; : : : ; ds+(k 1)S) for 1 s S   1, and set ~d0 = (;). There is a K0 > 0
such that, for all stationary deterministic policies ~ and all 0 s S  1,
( ~V(0)(
~ds)  ~V ~(0)(~ds))1Psi=1 di+(k 1)S<C1(k 1)S>T
K0
S 1X
=s
(~
(0)
(~d)  ~(~d))21Pi=1 di+(k 1)S<C 1(k 1)S>T a.s.
(S.2) There is a K3 > 0 such that
j~(x)  ~(0)(x)j K3jj (0)jj; (EC.11)
for all  2B with jj (0)jj  , and all states (x1; : : : ; xs) with
Ps
i=1 xi <C and s < S.
The proof of these two sensitivity properties is given below.
Application of (S.1), (S.2), and (EC.6) now gives
E
h
E
h
~V(0)(;)  ~V ~
H
(0)
(;)

1(k 1)S>T jH
ii
E
"
E
"
K0
S 1X
=0
(~
(0)
(~d)  ~H(~d))21Pi=1 di+(k 1)S<C 1(k 1)S>T jH
##
=E
"
K0
S 1X
=0
(~
(0)
(~d)  ~^+(k 1)S (~d))
21P
i=1 di+(k 1)S<C 1(k 1)S>T
#
E
"
K0K
2
3
S 1X
=0
(0)  ^+(k 1)S2 1(k 1)S>T
#
K4
S 1X
=0
log(+(k  1)S)
+(k  1)S ;
for some K4 independent of k and S.
We thus have
V(0)(C;1) 
kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
E[piminfdi; cig]
 ~V(0)(;)E[T]
1
(k  1)S +K4
S 1X
=0
log(+(k  1)S)
+(k  1)S
K5
kSX
t=1+(k 1)S
log(t)
t
; (EC.12)
for some K5 > 0, independent of k and S.
The proof of the theorem is complete by observing
Regret((); T ) =
TX
k=1
h
V(0)(C;1) 
kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
E[pidi]
i
 V(0)(C;1)+
TX
k=2
K5
kSX
t=1+(k 1)S
log(t)
t
 V(0)(C;1)+K5
TSX
t=1+S
log(t)
t
=O(log2(T )):
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Proof of (S.1)
Backward induction on s. Let s= S  1. If PS 1i=1 di+(k 1)S <C then Lemma EC.1(iii) implies
~V(0)(
~dS 1)  ~V ~(0)(~dS 1) = maxp2[pl;ph]ph(
(0)
0 +
(0)
1 p)  ~(~dS 1)h((0)0 +(0)1 ~(~dS 1))
K0(~(0)(~dS 1)  ~(~dS 1))2 a.s.,
and thus
( ~V(0)(
~dS 1)  ~V ~(0)(~dS 1)) 1PS 1i=1 di+(k 1)S<C 1(k 1)S>T
K0(~(0)(~dS 1)  ~(~dS 1))2 1PS 1i=1 di+(k 1)S<C 1(k 1)S>T a.s.
Now let 0 s < S  1. If Psi=1 di+(k 1)S =C then ~V(0)(~ds) = ~V ~(0)(~ds) = 0. If Psi=1 di+(k 1)S <C,
then, again using Lemma EC.1(iii),
~V(0)(
~ds)  ~V ~(0)(~ds)
= max
p2[pl;ph]

p  ( ~V(0)(~ds; 0)  ~V(0)(~ds; 1))

h(
(0)
0 +
(0)
1 p)+ ~V (~ds; 0)
 ~(~ds)  ( ~V(0)(~ds; 0)  ~V(0)(~ds; 1))h((0)0 +(0)1 ~(~ds))
+

~(~ds)  ( ~V(0)(~ds; 0)  ~V(0)(~ds; 1))

h(
(0)
0 +
(0)
1 ~(~ds))
 ~(~ds)  ( ~V ~(0)(~ds; 0)  ~V ~(0)(~ds; 1))h((0)0 +(0)1 ~(~ds))  ~V ~(~ds; 0)
K0(~(0)(~ds)  ~(~ds))2
+
 
~V(0)(
~ds; 0)  ~V ~(0)(~ds; 0)
   1 h((0)0 +(0)1 ~(~ds))
+
 
~V(0)(
~ds; 1)  ~V ~(0)(~ds; 1)
  (h((0)0 +(0)1 ~(~ds))
K0(~(0)(~ds)  ~(~ds))2+

~V(0)(
~ds+1)  ~V ~(0)(~ds+1)

a.s.,
and the induction hypothesis implies
( ~V(0)(
~ds)  ~V ~(0)(~ds))1Psi=1 di+(k 1)S<C1(k 1)S>T
K0
S 1X
=s
(~
(0)
(~d)  ~(~d))21Pi=1 di+(k 1)S<C1(k 1)S>T a.s.
Proof of (S.2)
Let x= (x1; : : : ; xs)2 ~X with
Ps
i=1 xi <C and s < S. We have
~(x)  ~(0)(x) = p~V(x;0)  ~V(x;1);   p

~V
(0)
(x;0)  ~V
(0)
(x;1);(0)
= pa;   pa(0);(0) ; (EC.13)
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in the notation of Lemma EC.1, with a = ~V(x; 0)   ~V(x; 1) and a(0) = ~V(0)(x; 0)   ~V(0)(x; 1).
Also we have that both (a;)2 UAB and (a(0); (0))2 UAB, since pl < ~(x); ~(0)(x)< ph (as noted
above, in the remarks below equation (EC.5)). The set
f ~V(x; 0)  ~V(x; 1) j  2B;
 (0) ;x2 ~Xgf 2B j  (0) g
is compact and contained in UAB. Since pa; is continuously dierentiable in a and  on UAB, it
follows by a rst order Taylor expansion that
jpa;   pa(0);(0) j K6(ja  a(0)j+ jj (0)jj); (EC.14)
for a K6 > 0 independent of a, a
(0). It is not dicult to show by backward induction that for all
x2 ~X there is a Kx > 0 such that, for all  with jj (0)jj  , ~V(x)  ~V(0)(x)Kx  (0) : (EC.15)
Combining (EC.13), (EC.14), and (EC.15), we obtain
j~(x)  ~(0)(x)j
K6(ja  a(0)j+ jj (0)jj)
K6(j ~V(x; 0)  ~V(0)(x; 0)j+ j ~V(x; 1)  ~V(0)(x; 1)j+ jj (0)jj)
K6(1+2max
x2 ~X
Kx)jj (0)jj:
This proves (S.2).
Proof of Theorem 3
First note that h, B and [pl; ph] satisfy the assumptions of Section 2.2.
The proof consists of three steps. In Step 1 we consider pricing strategies that select optimal
prices whenever inventory is strictly below C. For these strategies we show that the regret in a
single selling season is bounded from below by a term proportional to the mean squared estimation
error at the end of the selling season, viz. equation (EC.19). In Step 2 we prove a lower bound on
the expected value of this term, according to a probability density on (0). The proof is analogous to
the proof of the van Trees inequality in Gill and Levit (1995, Section 2). We cannot directly apply
their result, however, because we are in a slightly dierent setting (discrete instead of continuous
random variables, and non-deterministic number of observations upon which the estimate of 0 is
based); we therefore include a complete proof, resulting in equation (EC.24). In Step 3 we combine
the results of Step 1 and Step 2 to show that the regret in the k-th single selling season is bounded
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from below by a term proportional to 1=k; this implies that the total regret after T selling seasons
is bounded from below by a term proportional to logT .
Throughout the proof, let  be an arbitrary price strategy.
Step 1. Let  = (0; 1)2B be arbitrary and xed, and let k 2N, k 2. For shorthand notation,
write
h(p) = h(0+1p):
Dene
"= inf
2B
inf
p2[pl;ph]
minfh(p);1 h(p)g;
and note that " > 0. Let  0 be the pricing strategy that for all t 2 N coincides with  if ct = C,
and that equals the optimal price (ct; st) if ct < C. Let pi be the prices generated by  
0. For
1 j < S write ~dj = (d1+(k 1)S; : : : ; dj+(k 1)S)2 f0;1gj for the vector of demand realizations in the
rst j stages of season k, and set ~d0 = 0. For all j 2 f1; : : : ; S 1g, we have the following inequality:
V (C; j) E
h kSX
i=j+(k 1)S
pidi j ~dj 1 = 0
i
=h(

(C; j))  ((C; j)+V (C   1; j+1))+ (1 h((C; j))) V (C; j+1)
 E
h kSX
i=j+(k 1)S+1
pidi j ~dj 1 = 0; dj+(k 1)S = 1
i
P

dj+(k 1)S = 1 j ~dj 1 = 0

 E
h kSX
i=j+(k 1)S+1
pidi j ~dj 1 = 0; dj+(k 1)S = 0
i
P

d1+(k 1)S = 0 j ~dj 1 = 0

 E[pj+(k 1)S h(pj+(k 1)S) j ~dj 1 = 0]
= h(

(C; j))  ((C; j)+V (C   1; j+1))+ (1 h((C; j))) V (C; j+1)
 E
h
h(pj+(k 1)S)  (pj+(k 1)S +V (C   1; j+1))+ (1 h(pj+(k 1)S)) V (C; j+1) j ~dj 1 = 0
i
+E
h
h(pj+(k 1)S) j ~dj 1 = 0
i


V (C   1; j+1)) E
 kSX
i=j+(k 1)S+1
pidi j ~dj 1 = 0; dj+(k 1)S = 1

+E
h
1 h(pj+(k 1)S) j ~dj 1 = 0
i


V (C; j+1)) E
 kSX
i=j+(k 1)S+1
pidi j ~dj 1 = 0; dj+(k 1)S = 0

" 

V (C; j+1) E
h kSX
i=j+(k 1)S+1
pidi j ~dj = 0
i
: (EC.16)
In the rst equality we use the recursive denition of V (C; j), condition E[
PkS
i=j+1+(k 1)S pidi j
~dj 1 = 0] on the event fdj+(k 1)S = 1 j ~dj 1 = 0g and its complement, and use E[pj+(k 1)S dj+(k 1)S j
~dj 1 = 0] = E[pj+(k 1)S h(pj+(k 1)S) j ~dj 1 = 0]. In the second inequality we add and substract
E[h(pj+(k 1)S) V (C 1; j+1)+(1 h(pj+(k 1)S)) V (C; j+1) j ~dj 1 = 0], and use P (dj+(k 1)S =
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1 j ~dj 1 = 0) = E[h(pj+(k 1)S) j ~dj 1 = 0]. The inequality follows from the fact that (C; j), by
denition, maximizes
h(p)  (p+V (C   1; j+1))+ (1 h(p)) V (C; j+1); p2 [pl; ph];
and from
V (C   1; j+1)) E
 kSX
i=j+(k 1)S+1
pidi j ~dj 1 = 0; dj+(k 1)S = 1

= 0;
which follows from the fact that, by denition of  0, optimal prices are chosen whenever inventory
is strictly lower than C.
Repeated application of (EC.16) gives
V (C;1) E
 kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
pidi

 "S 1 

V (C;S) E

pkSdkS j ~dS 1 = 0

: (EC.17)
Write bkS for pkS multiplied by  21, given that ~dS 1 = 0:
bkS = 21  0kS(p1; : : : ; pkS 1; d1; : : : ; d(k 1)S;0;0; : : : ;0| {z }
S  1 zeros
):
Note that bkS (as well as all prices p(k 1)S+1; : : : ; pkS 1) only depends on prices p1; : : : ; p(k 1)S and
demand realizations d1; : : : ; d(k 1)S up to selling season k 1; in particular, bkS does not depend on
the event f~dS 1 = 0g. Together with (C;S) = 0=( 21) this implies
V (C;S) E
h
pkSdkS j ~dS 1 = 0
i
= (C;S)h(

(C;S)) E
h
pkS h(pkS) j ~dS 1 = 0
i
= 1E
h
((C;S)  pkS)2 j ~dS 1 = 0
i
=
 1
41
E
h
(0  bkS)2
i
: (EC.18)
Combining (EC.17) and (EC.18) with inf2B  141 = 1=3 yields
V (C;1) E
 kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
pidi

 1
3
"S 1E
h
(0  bkS)2
i
: (EC.19)
Step 2. In this step we view  as a random variable  = (0;1), drawn from B according to
the probability density function , dened by
(0; 1) =
256
3
cos2(80  11=2); (0; 1)2B:
We prove a lower bound on the term E
h
(0  bkS)2
i
in (EC.19), where the subscript  emphasizes
that we take expectation not only with respect to the distribution of the demand, but also with
respect to . To this end, we need to introduce some notation. Let D= (D1; : : : ;D(k 1)S), with Di
equal to the (random) demand in period i, 1 i (k 1)S. Note that, conditional on = , Di is
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Bernoulli with mean h(pi) if ci > 0, and Di = 0 with probability one if ci = 0. For d2 f0;1g(k 1)S,
let ci(d) = C  
P
j<i;SSj=SSi
dj be the inventory available at the beginning of period i given the
vector of demand realizations d, and write c(d) = (c1(d); : : : ; c(k 1)S(d)). Note that D takes values
in D = fd 2 f0;1g(k 1)S j d  c(d)g. The probability mass function f(d j ) of D, conditional on
= , is given by
f(d j ) =
(k 1)SY
i=1;
ci(d)>0
h(pi(d))
di(1 h(pi(d))1 di ;
where pi(d) is the price in period i, given demand realizations d1; : : : ; di 1, under strategy  0. For
d2D, write
b(d j ) = 21 0kS(p1(d); p2(d); : : : ; pkS 1; d1; : : : ; d(k 1)S;0;0; : : : ;0| {z }
S  1 zeros
)
for  21 times the price in period kS given that demand is zero in periods (k 1)S+1; : : : ; kS 1
and demand in preceding selling seasons is given by d; all of this conditional on = .
We now prove a lower bound on
E[(b(D j) 0)2] =
Z 6=8
5=8
Z  9=16
 3=4
X
d2D
f(d j 0; 1)(0; 1)(b(d j 0; 1) 0)2 d1d0:
By the mean-value theorem, there is a ~1 2 [ 3=4; 9=16] such that
E[(b(D j) 0)2] = 3
16
Z 6=8
5=8
X
d2D
f(d j 0; ~1)(0; ~1)(b(d j 0; ~1) 0)2 d0:
For notational convenience we stop writing the dependence of f , , b on ~1. Applying Cauchy-
Schwarz on the integral-sum and integrating by parts, we obtain
3
16
Z 6=8
5=8
X
d2D
(b(d j 0) 0)2f(d j 0)(0)d0 
Z 6=8
5=8
X
d2D
 @
@0
log(f(d j 0)(0))
2
f(d j 0)(0)d0
 3
16
Z 6=8
5=8
X
d2D
(b(d j 0) 0)
 @
@0
log(f(d j 0)(0))

f(d j 0)(0)d0
=
3
16
X
d2D
b(d j 0)

f(d j 6=8)(6=8)  f(d j 5=8)(5=8)

  3
16
X
d2D
0

f(d j 6=8)(6=8)  f(d j 5=8)(5=8)

+
3
16
Z 6=8
5=8
X
d2D
f(d j 0)(0)d0 = 1; (EC.20)
since (5=8) = (6=8) = 0 and
R 6=8
5=8
(0)d0 =
R 6=8
5=8
(0; ~1)d0 = 16=3.
We have Z 6=8
5=8
 @
@0
log((0))
2
(0)d0 =
40962
3
; (EC.21)
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and
E

@
@0
log f(D j 0)

=
X
d2D
@
@0
f(d j 0) = 0 for all 0, (EC.22)
and
E
"
@
@0
log f(D j 0)
2#
=E
2664
0BB@ (k 1)SX
i=1;
ci(D)>0
Di h0(pi(D))
h0(pi(D))(1 h0(pi(D)))
1CCA
23775
=
(k 1)SX
i=1;
ci(D)>0
1
h0(pi(D))(1 h0(pi(D)))
 (k  1)S
"2
; (EC.23)
which follows from
E

Di h0(pi(D))
h0(pi(D))(1 h0(pi(D)))
 Dj  h0(pj(D))
h0(pj(D))(1 h0(pj(D)))

= 0
for all i 6= j with ci(D)> 0, cj(D)> 0, and
E
"
Di h0(pi(D))
h0(pi(D))(1 h0(pi(D)))
2#
=
1
h0(pi(D))(1 h0(pi(D)))
for all i with ci(D)> 0.
Plugging (EC.21), (EC.22) and (EC.23) into (EC.20), we obtain the following lower bound:
E[(b(D j) 0)2] 16
3
 Z 6=8
5=8
X
d2D
 @
@0
log(f(d j 0)(0))
2
f(d j 0)(0)d0
! 1
 1
(k  1)S="2+ 40962
3
: (EC.24)
Step 3. Combining (EC.19) and (EC.24), we obtain
sup
(0)2B
Regret( ;T )E[Regret( ;T )]

TX
k=2
E

V (C;1) E
 kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
pidi


TX
k=2
1
3
"S 1E[(b(D1; : : : ;D(k 1)S j) 0)2]

TX
k=2
1
3
"S 1
1
(k  1)S="2+ 40962
3
K0 log(T );
where we dene
K0 =
1
3
"S 1
1
maxfS="2; 40962
3
g 
1
2 log(2)
:
This completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 2 shows, for the base case of non-overlapping selling seasons with non-varying
capacity and season length, that the regret of the k-th selling season (k 2) satises
V(0)(C;1) 
kSX
i=1+(k 1)S
E[piminfdi; cig]K5
kSX
t=1+(k 1)S
log(t)
t
; (EC.25)
for some K5 > 0 independent of k; viz. Equation (EC.12).
For any season j, estimation of (0) to determine the prices during season j is based only on (i)
sales data preceding tj and (ii) sales data generated during season j (thus, all sales data generated
in other seasons overlapping with season j is neglected). Because of this assumption, we can use
the same MDP as the one constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 to show, analogous to (EC.25),
that the regret of the j-th selling season (tj > 1) satises
V(0);Sj (Cj;1) 
SjX
s=1
E[pj;sdj;s]K5
SjX
s=1
log(tj   1+ s)
tj   1+ s
K5Sj log(tj)=tj
for some constant K5 = K5(Cj; Sj). The constant Kj(Cj; Sj) may depend on Cj and Sj. How-
ever, ~K5 := supj2NSjK5(Cj; Sj) does not depend on (Cj; Sj), and ~K5 <1 because it is simply a
supremum over a nite set (note that Cj and Sj are bounded). It follows that
Regret(0(); T ) =
X
j:tj 1+Sj<T
n
V(0);Sj (Cj;1) 
SjX
s=1
E[pj;sdj;s]
o

X
j:tj=1
V(0);Sj (Cj;1)+
X
j:tj>1;tj 1+Sj<T
~K5 log(tj)=tj
 V(0);Sj (Cj;1)  sup
t2N
jfj 2N : tj = tgj+
TX
i=2
X
j:tj=i;tj 1+Sj<T
~K5 log(tj)=tj
 V(0);Sj (Cj;1)  sup
t2N
jfj 2N : tj = tgj+
TX
i=2
~K5 sup
t2N
jfj 2N : tj = tgj  log(i)=i
=O(log2(T )):
EC.2. Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma EC.1. For all a2R and  2B, dene the function fa; : [pl; ph]!R, f(p) = (p a)h(0+
1p). Write _fa;(p) and fa;(p) for the rst and second derivative of fa;(p) with respect to p, and
let pa; = argmaxp2[pl;ph] fa;(p). In addition, let
UB =
n
(0; 1)2R ( 1;0)
0<h(z)< 1 and _h(z)> 0, for all z = 0+1p, p2 [pl; ph] o
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and
UAB =

(a;0; 1)2RUB
pa; 2 (pl; ph)	 :
Then:
(i) For each (a;) 2 RUB, pa; is uniquely dened, and for each (a;) 2 UAB, _f(pa;) = 0 and
f(pa;)< 0.
(ii) On UAB, pa; is continuously dierentiable in a and , strictly increasing in a, and nondecreas-
ing in 0 and 1. On RUB, pa; is nondecreasing in a, 0 and 1. In addition, on UAB, fa;(pa;)
is continuously dierentiable in a and , strictly decreasing in a, and strictly increasing in 0 and
1.
(iii) There is a K0 > 0 such that fa;(p

a;)  fa;(p)K0(p  pa;)2 for all p 2 [pl; ph] and (a;) 2
UAB.
Lemma EC.2. Let  2B be arbitrary.
(i) V(c; s) 0 for all 1 cC and 1 s < S.
(ii) ph  V(1; s) V(1; s+1) pl for all 1 s < S.
(iii) V(c; s)V (c+1; s) for all 1 cC and 1 s S.
(iv) V0(1; s) V(1; s), for all 1 s S and all 0 = (00; 01)2B with 00  0 and 01  1.
(v) (C;S) (c; s) (1;1), for all 1 cC and 1 s S.
(vi) (c; s) is continuous in , for all 1 cC and 1 s S.
Lemma EC.3. Let k 2N and  > 0. If there are s; s0 2 f1; : : : ; Sg such that jps+(k 1)S ps0+(k 1)Sj 
 and c(s+(k  1)S)c(s0+(k  1)S)> 0, then min(PkS) min(P(k 1)S)+ 122(1+ p2h) 1.
Proof of Lemma EC.1
(i) Let (a;)2RUB. We have
_f(p) = h(0+1p)+ (p  a)1 _h(0+1p)
and
f(p) = 21 _h(0+1p)+ (p  a)21h(0+1p);
for all p2 [pl; ph]. Log-concavity of h implies
2  h(z)
h(z)
_h(z)2
= 1+
_h(z)2 h(z)h(z)
h(z)2
 h(z)
2
_h(z)2
= 1  h(z)
2
_h(z)2
 @
2 log(h(z))
@z2
> 0;
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for all z = 0+1p, p2 [pl; ph]. It follows that all p2 [pl; ph] with _f(p) = 0 satisfy
f(p) = 21 _h(0+1p)+
 h(0+1p)
1 _h(0+1p)
21
h(0+1p)
= 1 _h(0+1p)
h
2  h(0+1p)
h(0+1p)
_h(0+1p)2
i
< 0:
This implies that either fa;(p) is strictly monotone on [pl; ph] (in which case the unique maximum
of fa;(p) is on the boundary of [pl; ph], or fa;(p) has a unique maximum p

a; on [pl; ph] with
f(pa;)< 0.
(ii) Note that UAB is an open set, and that, for each (a;) 2 UAB, the equation _fa;(p) = 0 has
a unique solution pa; 2 (pl; ph) with fa;(pa;) < 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem (see e.g.
Duistermaat and Kolk 2004), pa; is continuously dierentiable in a and  on UAB, with derivatives
given by
@pa;
@a

a;
=
 1
fa;(pa;)
 @
_fa;(p)
@a

p
a;
and
@pa;
@i

a;
=
 1
fa;(pa;)
 @
_fa;(p)
@i

p
a;
; (i= 1;2):
For all (a;)2 UAB we have fa;(pa;)< 0,
@ _fa;(p)
@a

p
a;
= 1 _h(0+1pa;)> 0; (EC.26)
@
@0
_fa;(p)

p
a;
= _h(0+1p

a;)+ (p

a;   a)1h(0+1pa;) (EC.27)
= _h(0+1p

a;)
 
1  h(0+1p

a;)
h(0+1p

a;)
_h(0+1pa;)2
!
 0;
and
@
@1
_fa;(p)

p
a;
= pa; _h(0+1p

a;)+ (p

a;   a) _h(0+1pa;)+ pa;(pa;   a)1h(0+1pa;)
(EC.28)
= pa;
@
@0
_f(p)

p
a;
+
1
 1h(0+1p

a;) 0;
using (pa;   a)1 = h(0 + 1pa;)= _h(0 + 1pa;) and log-concavity of h. It follows that pa; is
strictly increasing in a and nondecreasing in 0 and 1.
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If (a;) 2 R  UB and pa; = pl, then _fa;(pl)  0. By (EC.26), @@a _fa;(pl)  0, which implies
_fa0;(pl) 0 and pa0; = pl for all a0  a. By (EC.27) and (EC.28),
@
@0
_fa;(pl) = _h(0+1pl)+ (pl  a)1h(0+1pl)

_h(0+1pl)
h(0+1pl)
 ( _fa;(pl) h(0+1pl)) 
h(0+1pl)h(0+1pl)
_h(0+1pl)2
 0;
and
@
@1
_fa;(pl) = pl
@
@0
_fa;(pl)+
( _fa;(pl) h(0+1pl))
1
 0;
using _fa;(pl) h(0+1pl) 0 and log-concavity of h. This implies _fa;0(pl) 0 and thus pa;0 = pl
for all 0 2B with 0   (in both coordinates). By similar arguments we can show that pa0;0 = ph if
pa; = ph, a
0  a and 0  . These observations, combined with the fact that pa; is nondecreasing
in a, 0 and 1 if p

a; 2 (pl; ph), show that pa; is nondecreasing in a, 0 and 1 on RUB.
The assertions on fa;(p

a;) follow by observing that
@fa;(p

a;)
@a

a;
=
@fa;(p)
@p

p
a;
 @p

a;
@a

a;
+
@fa;(p)
@a

p
a;
= 0 h(0+1pa;)< 0;
@fa;(p

a;)
@0

a;
=
@fa;(p)
@p

p
a;
 @p

a;
@0

a;
+
@fa;(p)
@0

p
a;
= 0+ (pa;   a) _h(0+1pa;) =
 h(0+1pa;)
1
> 0;
and
@fa;(p

a;)
@1

a;
=
@fa;(p)
@p

p
a;
 @p

a;
@1

a;
+
@fa;(p)
@1

p
a;
= 0+ (pa;   a)pa; _h(0+1pa;) =
 h(0+1pa;)pa;
1
> 0;
again using (pa;   a)1 = h(0+1pa;)= _h(0+1pa;).
(iii) Let K0 = sup(a;;p)2UAB[pl;ph]  fa;(p)=2. Since fa;(p) is dened and continuous on the
closure of UAB  [pl; ph] (which is compact) and since fa;(pa;)< 0 for all (a;) 2 UAB, it follows
that 0<K0 <1. A Taylor expansion then implies
fa;(p) fa;(pa;) K0(p  pa;)2;
using _fa;(p

a;) = 0 for all (a;)2 UAB.
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Proof of Lemma EC.2
Throughout the proof, x  2B.
(i) If s= S then V(c;S) = 0 for c > 1 or c= 0, and V(1; S) =maxp2[pl;ph] ph(0+ 1p) 0. If
s < S then by backward induction on s,
V(c; s) = (

(c; s) V(c; s+1))h(0+1(c; s))+V(c; s+1)
  ((c  1; s) V(c  1; s+1))h(0+1(c  1; s)) V(c  1; s+1)
 ((c  1; s) V(c; s+1))h(0+1(c  1; s))+V(c; s+1)
  ((c  1; s) V(c  1; s+1))h(0+1(c  1; s)) V(c  1; s+1)
=V(c; s+1))(1 h(0+1(c  1; s)))
+V(c  1; s+1))h(0+1(c  1; s)) 0:
(ii) By backward induction on s it follows that V (1; s)2 [pl; ph] for all 1 s S. This implies
V(1; s) = h(0+1(1; s))(1; s)+ (1 h(0+1(1; s)))V (1; s+1)
 h(0+1V (1; s+1))V (1; s+1)+ (1 h(0+1V (1; s+1)))V (1; s+1)
= V (1; s+1);
for all 1 s < S.
(iii) The proof is by backward induction on s, and mimics the proof of Proposition 5.2, page 238
of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). For s= S the assertion follows immediately from V(1; s) 0
and V(c; s) = 0 for all 2 cC. Now assume the assertion is true for s+1, and consider stage
s, 1 s < S. For 2 cC we have
V(c+1; s) V(c; s)
=((c+1; s) V(c+1; s+1)h(0+1(c+1; s))+V(c+1; s+1)
 ((c; s) V(c; s+1)h(0+1(c; s)) V(c; s+1)
 ((c; s) V(c; s+1)h(0+1(c; s)) V(c; s+1)
+((c  1; s) V(c  1; s+1)h(0+1(c  1; s))+V(c  1; s+1)
(1 h(0+1(c+1; s)))(V(c+1; s+1) V(c; s+1))
+h(0+1

(c  1; s)))(V(c; s+1) V(c  1; s+1))
0;
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using the optimality of (c; s) and the induction hypothesis, and for c= 1 we have
V(2; s) V(1; s)
((2; s) V(2; s+1)h(0+1(2; s))+V(2; s+1)
 ((1; s) V(1; s+1)h(0+1(1; s)) V(1; s+1)
(1 h(0+1(2; s)))(V(2; s+1) V(1; s+1)) 0;
using the induction hypothesis.
(iv) The proof is by backward induction on s.
First observe that for all xed p2 [pl; ph] and 0 a p,
@
@0
fph(0+1p)+ a(1 h(0+1p))g= (p  a) _h(0+1p) 0 (EC.29)
and
@
@1
fph(0+1p)+ a(1 h(0+1p))g= p(p  a) _h(0+1p) 0: (EC.30)
The optimality of (1; S), together with (EC.29) and (EC.30) applied to p= 

(1; S) and a= 0,
implies for any 0 = (00; 
0
1)2B with 00  0 and 01  1,
V(1; S) =

(1; S)h(0+1

(1; S)) 0(1; S)h(0+10(1; S))
0(1; S)h(00+010(1; S)) = V0(1; S):
Let 1 s < S, and assume the assertion is true for s+1; : : : ; S. Since V(1; s+1) = V(1; s+1)2
(pl; ph) by (ii), it follows that 

(1; s) V(1; s+1). The optimality of (1; s) and the induction
hypothesis, together with equations (EC.29) and (EC.30) applied to p= (1; s) and a= V(1; s+
1), imply for any 0 = (00; 
0
1)2B with 00  0 and 01  1,
V(1; s) =

(1; s)h(0+1

(1; s))+V(1; s+1)  (1 h(u+u(1; s)))
0(1; s)h(0+10(1; s))+V0(1; s+1)  (1 h(0+10(1; s)))
0(1; s)h(00+010(1; s))+V0(1; s+1)  (1 h(00+010(1; s)))
=V0(1; s):
(v) For all 1 s < S and 1 cC, we have by (repeated) application of (i) and (ii),
0V(c; s+1)V(1; s+1)V(1;2):
Let pa; be as in Lemma EC.1. Since
(C;S) = p

0;; 

(c; s) = p

V(c;s+1);
; and (1;1) = p

V(1;2);
;
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it follows from Lemma EC.1(ii) that (C;S) (c; s) (1;1).
For s= S, note that (C;S) = 

(c; s) = 

(1; S) = p

0;  pV(1;2) = (1;1), for all 1 cC.
(vi) Let 1 cC and 1 s S. Since (c; s) = pV(c;s+1); and (c; s)2 [(C;S); (1;1)]
(pl; ph) (Lemma EC.2(v) and equation (4)), we have (V(c; s+ 1); ) 2 UAB. The continuity as-
sertion then follows from Lemma EC.1(ii).
Proof of Lemma EC.3
For any 22 positive denite matrix A with eigenvalues 0<1  2, we have 2  1+2 = tr(A),
det(A) = 12, and consequentially 1 =det(A)=2  det(A)=tr(A). For a; b ph we thus have
min

2 a+ b
a+ b a2+ b2

 2a
2+2b2  (a+ b)2
2+ a2+ b2
 (a  b)
2
2(1+ p2h)
:
Since min(Pt)  min(Pr) + min(Pr0) for all r; r0; t 2 N with r + r0 = t (Bhatia 1997, Corollary
III.2.2, page 63), we have
min(PkS) min(P(k 1)S)+min
0@ X
1iS;i=2fs;s0g

1
pi+(k 1)S

(1; pi+(k 1)S)1ci+(k 1)S>0
1A
+min

1
ps+(k 1)S

(1; ps+(k 1)S)1cs+(k 1)S>0+

1
ps0+(k 1)S

(1; ps0+(k 1)S)1cs0+(k 1)S>0

 min(P(k 1)S)+ (ps+(k 1)S   ps
0+(k 1)S)2
2(1+ p2h)
 min(P(k 1)S)+ 
2
2(1+ p2h)
:
